As Iran continues to evade sanctions on its oil exports through sophisticated cover-ups, WikIran reveals, once again, how Iran's shadow network operates in parallel across China, Hong Kong and the UAE. At the heart of these operations is Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), a front company for the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), designated by the US Treasury. The recently leaked Abolfathi servers confirm that SEJ is behind a vast web of shell companies enabling the continues export of Iranian oil, evasion of sanctions and ongoing economic and security empowerment for Iran.

Following our previous investigations into the AFGS oil export mechanism, using sophisticated cover networks to conceal Iranian origin, we now expose new components of this complex system. According to the latest leaked information, SEJ not only maintains its existing cover networks but also developed new infrastructure, revealed here for the first time.

Following the leak, new documents have surfaced implicating eight previously unknown front companies used by SEJ. Each company plays a distinct role in the export chain, collectively creating a sophisticated cover-up designed to mask Iranian identity and sustain business operations uninterrupted.

We’ve previously explained how SEJ front companies functions and the key differences between them. For clarity purposes, it’s essential to distinguish between two types:

• Shipping Fronts are responsible for falsifying the origin of petroleum, making it appear to come from Malaysia, and transporting it to secondary front companies, the Domestic Consignees • Domestic Consignees take ownership of the oil and sell it using their own bank accounts in China or Hong Kong.

Abolfathi's email server host approximately 35 email addresses, all used to disguise SEJ's activities. Among the data, 19 shell companies and shadow banking entities were identified, some being disclosed for the first time:

An example from the server illustrates how a new email domain is created:

without the leak of Aboalfathi’s email server, identifying these entities as Iranian front companies would have been nearly impossible. According to the materials, recently sanctioned Luan Bird Shipping Services LLC is a major SEJ front company based in the UAE. It functions as the operational and tactical arm of SEJ, serving as a primary liaison with vessels owners and captains on all matters related to AFGS oil exports.

Below is a list of email addresses used by SEJ on a continuous and daily basis, as confirmed by the recent leak. Remember: These domains are not legitimate, they are a part of a deliberate deception, exploiting the trust of customers and vessel owners who remain unaware of their true affiliation. Each of these domains conceals the same Iranian entity, an Iranian oil export company already designated by the US Treasury. These domains are a significant component of SEJ's success in exporting Iranian oil, enabling it to evade sanctions and sustain Iran’s financial and military strength.

How the mechanism works? As previously mentioned, SEJ operates on several fronts simultaneously. One axis involved direct engagement with clients and brokers in the oil business, negotiating deals and contracts. Throughout these interactions, the involvement of Iranian tankers or oil is rarely, if ever, disclosed. In many cases, Iranian tankers are concealed and designated vessels are used under false cover [link wikiran.org/articles/97].

The second axis targets the captain of the vessel, who acts as the exclusive representative for the vessel’s operations. In most cases, there’s no direct link between SEJ and the owners of the vessel - only between SEJ and the captain.

Unlike interactions with clients and brokers, captains involved in this scheme knowingly collaborate with SEJ’s scam, using forged documents and false identities, deliberately committing a felony.

Use Case: Luan Bird Shipping Services LLC

The following example shows how the SEJ network and oil export process work:

In this document, Luan Bird Shipping Services LLC appeals to Kawakab Shipping Inc., the owner of the Iran-flagged, NITC-owned vessel SOBAR. The letter explains that the vessel was laid by Tida Co (a known SEJ front company) and co-signed by Swanal Co Ltd (a company listed in the table of domains above). However, the vessel arrived at its destination without a Bill of Lading.

In the same letter, Luan Bird requests permission from the vessel owners (NITC) to proceed with export and not wait for the arrival of the Bill of Lading, a move that is not only unusual but also illegal.

Under standard international shipping protocols governed by conventions such as the Hague-Visby Rules, the Bill of Lading is a critical document serving as a receipt, contract of carriage, and document of title. It must be properly processed before any legal export can proceed. A request to bypass this requirement is a clear indication of an attempt to circumvent regulatory oversight - potentially constituting document fraud, smuggling or money laundering designed to move goods without proper documentation or customs clearance.

This illegal practice undermines the international shipping system and exposes all parties involved to significant legal risks, including customs violations, maritime law infractions, and potential criminal charges for facilitating illicit trade.

In addition, the type of cargo listed in the document is "Omani oil". However, this is only a ruse to hide the export of Iranian oil. This cover-up allows Iran to export oil easily and at the same time allows customers and brokers to trade oil.

Use Case: Hengli General Trading LLC

Another example of SEJ deceptive operations is a letter sent from the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) to [email protected], a domain used by Hengli General Trading LLC.

According to the letter, Majid Azemi, known as the CEO of SEJ, is also listed as the CEO of Hengli General Trading LLC, which functions as a charter company:

These examples illustrate the highly sophisticated cover infrastructure that Iran has built and continues to expand every day. Each of these companies plays a small but essential role in the Iranian oil export system. These companies typically handle only a limited number of projects to remain under the radar. When needed, other companies step up to complete the work. This is how the mechanism has operated for years – uninterrupted, undetected and increasingly resilient.

WikIran is firmly calling for an end to these schemes. Every day Iran continues to evade sanctions, it grows stronger. It's time to designate these dangerous entities and enforce the sanctions in full. Only then will Iran will be forced to confront the consequences of its actions.

Full list of front companies and bank accounts: