WikIran’s exclusive materials reveal the massive scale of Sepehr Energy Jahan’s (SEJ) shadow-fleet operations, designed to conceal the identities of sanctioned tankers. The documents provide a detailed overview of the method, directly enabling the funding of both the AFGS and IRGC-QF.

Over the past year, WikIran unfolded another key part of the Iranian security apparatus’ oil-export business, through the materials of Sepehr Energy Jahan’s (SEJ) and AFGS Shahid Abolfathi Oil Command.

Following the publication of our article on the shadow-fleet’s tactic, involving tanker identity-theft, the WikIran team obtained additional exclusive documents shedding new light on the method and providing a better understanding of the way it works. After a thorough verification process, we can confirm the authenticity of the exclusive materials and present them to our readers.

The photos provided to WikIran revel more clandestine shipments and stolen identities of supposedly legitimate vessels. The most astonishing detail in the spreadsheets is the fact that the stolen identity is explicitly labeled as the “Fake Name” of the vessel, along with real vessel identity, shipping dates, loaded volume, discount per barrel, total cargo value, allocation of the revenues and contract conditions.

Exposing the Method

The documents reveal that SEJ obtained significant quantities of counterfeit tanker identities, used to create a network of what can be referred to as “Trojan Vessels”. The false identity allows the designated vessel to pass through the port's gatekeepers (port agents, customs, etc.) before discharging disguised Iranian crude oil, thus becoming a “Trojan Tanker”. The stolen and fabricated identifiers, such as official registration papers or the captain’s signature, are applied to every formal document along the way, from loading to discharge.

The complexity of this operation is further heightened by the practice of assigning a different fake name for each voyage. That means that a single designated tanker can assume multiple stolen identities, and multiple tankers can reuse the same stolen identity for different shipments. Moreover, the operators appear to deliberately limit the reuse of a particular fake identity to avoid drawing attention.

This method is likely made possible by the ridiculously high discounts offered on the shipments, ranging from 9 to 17 USD per barrel, which is consistent with previously identified SEJ dealing. It’s plausible that these discounts are intended to compensate customers for the increased risk of overlooking the dubious paperwork containing falsified identities. This approach is deliberate, reflecting the harsh competitive environment in which Iranian petroleum exporters operate. These higher discounts further erode the earnings for all Iranian exporters, forcing the economy to rely on even lower oil prices.

Case Study #1: LIMAS & KALLISTA

According to the materials, the sanctioned tanker LIMAS (IMO: 9254082) carried out a shipment under the name DHT CHINA (IMO: 9315161) in October 2024. It then sailed under the name KALLISTA (IMO: 9411965) in December 2024 and again in February 2025. Over a short five-month period, the LIMAS moved oil worth approximately $375 million, evading US sanctions.

The SEJ databases contains official bills of lading, issued by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), for the KALLISTA shipments. The dates and cargos listed in those records match the new information uncovered here for the first time:

The misuse of KALLISTA’s identity led to the mistaken designation of the vessel and its owners by the US Treasury in November 2025, thus proving the method's effectiveness. Shortly after, the designations were removed.

Case Study #2: YUAN SHAN HU

YUAN SHAN HU (IMO: 9417189) is another stolen identity. On December 2024, the tanker Quinn (IMO: 9220952) disguised itself as YUAN SHAN HU, carrying approximately 2 million barrels of Iranian oil. The stolen identity was also used by the tanker URI (previously known as BOREAS, IMO: 9248497) in April 2025.

Information based on AIS tracking support the presented case: Records confirm that the vessel YUAN SHAN HU was located near the Strait of Malacca at December 2024 and near Nigeria at April 2025, all while the “Trojan Vessels” claiming its identity were logged in distant locations around the same times. Many of those locations are Chinese ports known for enabling loading and discharging of sanctioned Iranian crude oil.

One question remains unanswered – why were these particular tankers chosen as “Trojan Identities”, and how did their unique identifiers end up in SEJ’s possession? Perhaps, through bribes or deception, SEJ convinced shipping companies, port agents or insurance firms to provide tankers’ official papers. Another plausible source is the companies that own and operate the vessels – they may have been complicit, either by failing to protect sensitive information or by being paid for it. Because so many parties are involved, we cannot say for certain.

What we can state with confidence is that a new, more advanced tactic is at work. We encourage any individual or organization with additional information regarding this method to share it with us so we can expose it on our website.

Follow The Money

It’s no secret that oil revenues play a vital role in the Iranian security forces’ budget. However, concrete evidence linking specific tankers to the terrorist groups that benefit from these sales is a rare occurrence.

Upon closer examination of the materials, it becomes clear that a portion of these oil revenues is directly allocated to the IRGC-QF (“نقسا”, Quds Force) budget. In late 2024, the tankers PHONIX (IMO: 9198317) and QUINN (IMO: 9220952) operated under the stolen identities, using the vessels C. MIGHTY (IMO: 9422158) & YUAN SHAN HU (IMO: 9417189) to transport sanctioned light oil undetected. The cargo, valued at around $250 million, was likely used to fund Iranian proxy groups and fund international terrorism.

The scheme described in this article is among the most lucrative we have uncovered. Between October 2024 and January 2025, “Trojan Tanker” shipments generated almost $1.5 billion in revenue. Over the past two years, the total value of the shipments documented in the photographs reaches up to $4 billion.

Make no mistake: none of this income is invested in the Iranian people, but instead funds the brutal oppression and murder of peaceful protestors and innocent civilians.

The vast number of stolen identities uncovered, as well as the enormous value of the shipments, suggests an organized system, almost guarantees that there are designated vessels currently sailing under false identities. Therefore, it is imperative that we emphasize the urgent need for strong, coordinated enforcement mechanisms in global maritime shipping. If such mechanisms are not put in place soon, we will likely encounter more cases of identity theft and mistaken designations that could damage worldwide oil trading.

Until then, if you own or operate a vessel, we recommend checking your identity against our Vessels Archive to ensure it is not inadvertently assisting in sanction evasion.

Full list of unsanctioned vessels mentioned in the photos: