Tempest in a Teapot: Exposing New Evidence of Chinese Refineries and Other Customers Purchasing Petroleum From IRGC Trading Arms

Newly-exposed documents of Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command reveal the activities of its customers, including Chinese independent “teapot” refineries.

The success of every business is often dependent on its customers. Good customers are typically reliable big spenders, with interests mostly aligned with the seller’s interests. In the case of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Corps (IRGC), its favorite customers are Chinese independent refineries, also known as “Teapots”. The newly-exposed documents of Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command reveal the scope of this heavily-sanctioned trade. These documents provide insight into the activities of six entities, including two prominent refineries: Qicheng Petrochemical Refinery and Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. The latter was recently designated by the US Treasury for its lack of regard for US sanctions and their propensity for evading them.

This letter of intent (LOI) issued by UAE-based and recently sanctioned company Universal Fortune Trading L.L.C, offers a glimpse into the IRGC’s oil trade. The LOI provides key information on dealing with IRGC’s oil broker – GDCP. Universal Fortune serves as a front/broker, the oil is undeniably Iranian, and the lucky refiner is Qicheng Petrochemical. Interesting enough, the payment terms (as suggested by the potential buyer) are extremely harsh, including a payment term of 110% advance payment, which is likely to be attractive to the IRGC due to the shady nature of this business:

The documents concerning Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd are even more incriminating. A document for a discharge and delivery without a Bill of Lading (BL) names a Jiandi HK Limited and Hongkong Blue Ocean Limited as she shipper and consignee, respectively. Both companies are sanctioned IRGC fronts, as discussed on our previous article. Furthermore, Hengli was directly informed of this unconventional crude discharge:

Another recurring customer is Haokun Energy Group Co., Ltd (HEKG), a Chinese company designated by the US Treasury since 2022. Haokun has a notorious reputation for dealing with IRGC and Quds-Forces operatives. Unlike previously customers, Haokun has a poor payment behavior, with a debt of over $826 million, as of November 2025.

Two other customers identified in the documents are Tianjin Huiyue International Trading Co., Ltd and Shandong North Shengtong Petroleum Co Ltd. While the exact role of these companies in the IRGC’s oil trade is unclear, it is believed that they may serve as fronts or brokers on behalf of other Chinese refineries. The methods used by the IRGC to export petroleum in a clandestine manner mimic and inspire those used by the other Iranian military organizations, and are constantly evolving. Understanding the methods is crucial to accurately identifying the different roles of each entity involved. This information is invaluable, as many different actors use to undermine harmful schemes run by the Islamic Regime and its security apparatus. See below a list of GDCP customers and brokers identified in the materials: