Money Mules: The Overlooked Backbone of The Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism and Illicit Oil Trade

The HMS and PDECO leak unveils a fleet of money mules located in the UAE, used by the Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism to transfer illicit funds and bypass sanctions undetected.

Over the past years, HMS Trading and Petro Delta Energy Co. (PDECO) have built an extensive commercial network designed to export Iranian oil while remaining invisible to regulators. At its core are thousands of front companies, entities that merely exist on paper. Their purpose is to serve as “legitimate” cover for Iranian activities – legal entities to sign contracts, intermediaries for oil shipments and replaceable bank accounts for money transfers that would otherwise be blocked by international sanctions.

To keep this web of deception credible, the Iranian Shadow Banking mechanism deliberately recruits easily accessible foreign nationals, often referred to as ‘mules’ or ‘money mules’, to serve as managers, directors, or representatives of front companies. These individuals are hired to sign contracts, carry out physical cash transfers, and register new front companies in their names. Though they hold no real authority beyond providing signatures, these mules play a vital role in the sanction-bypassing operations of HMS and PDECO.

In this article, WikIran exposes common money mule techniques that are used to facilitate HMS and PDECO’s covert oil exports.

The Company Representative

As noted above, money mules are recruited to establish front companies, which subsequently facilitate multiple stages of illicit Iranian oil transactions.

One example from the leaked materials involves an oil deal between HMS Trading and UAE-based Daduru Goods Wholesalers L.L.C Company. Daduru Goods was previously exposed on WikIran in 2022 as a front company used by Ehsan Tahayyori’s exchange house, Arz-Iran. In a confidential partnership agreement document, Daduru Goods’ listed CEO and Guarantor is Indian national Azhar Ashraf Moosafi Kallinki, holding Indian passport W7594379 and UAE ID No. 784-1986-0715498-0.

Kallinki is serving as a signatory on documents that, in reality, connect Iranian entities with their trade partners abroad.

The Cash Collector

Another classic use of money mules is cash collection and cash transfers – a tactic implemented to further obfuscate the origin and ultimate beneficiary of designated oil revenues. The use of money mules to collect proceeds from oil deals is well documented within the HMS dataset. The following example from 2025 shows that PDECO utilized Indian national and UAE resident Abdul Salam Aboobacker Pallikkal Addakkadanaknd (UAE ID No. 784-1975-2792050-4) to receive a transfer of approximately one million dirhams from a NIOC front company, Tukriz Fuel Trading. Notably, the mule’s listed employer is Merinos General Trading LLC – likely another front – and his occupation is described as “messenger”:

By deploying a fleet of disposable “representatives” and cash collectors, HMS and PDECO are able to run a clandestine enterprise of illegal oil export and prohibited money laundering operations, while maintaining a cover of what appears to be legitimate commercial activity.

Below is a list of individuals identified as money mules in the HMS materials:

Although these mules may seem like minor players in the mechanism, they provide a critical, irreplaceable service that Iranian entities cannot fulfill themselves.

The structured undermining of international sanctions ultimately enables the funneling of funds to the Iranian regime. The mules’ activity threatens the local financial systems, because every entity engaged with them essentially facilitates money laundering. All those involved – companies, banks and the mules themselves – are exposed to sanctions and other severe penalties.

WikIran emphasizes the clear need for stronger enforcement and better due diligence processes to halt the Iranian exploitation of the international financial system and the terror is funds.