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136 results

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The Proof Is in the Powder: KPMC, MODAFL's aluminum powder contractor, deceives its global customers and suppliersJun 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran exposes KPMC, an Iranian aluminum powder manufacturer serving as MODAFL's go-to supplier for ballistic missile solid-fuel, while misleading international customers into believing it operates a legitimate commercial business, exposing both buyers and sellers to regulatory actions and sanctions. Khorasan Powder Metallurgy Engineering and Designing Company (KPMC) was established in the early 1990s by engineer Hossein Zabol Abbasi in the Khorasan region of Iran. What began as a modest powder metallurgy venture has evolved into a multifaceted powder producer with over 30 years of industry experience. none KPMC operates as a privately held limited liability company, predominantly owned and managed by the Zabol Abbasi family. Hossein Zabol Abbasi currently serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors, while his son Mohammed Hossein Zabol Abbasi golds the position of the CEO, while Hossien currently serve

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Breaking The Bank: Exposing Banks Facilitating Iranian Sanctions Evasion and Money Laundering for GDCP and Nosazan KavehJun 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Based on recently leaked databases, WikIran has identified several banks providing financial services to Iranian front companies and clients associated with two Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) front companies: GDCP and Nosazan Kaveh. Whether knowingly or not, these banks have facilitated international sanctions evasion and enabled money laundering that directly benefitted the IRGC. The disclosures illuminate hidden relationships between banking institutions and entities tied to Iran’s IRGC, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) regulations. Going over the leaked documents, it appears that banks across the globe, from China to the UAE, are providing key financial services to front companies and clients of GDCP and Nosazan Kaveh, the trading arms of Iran's IRGC. This association enables sanctions evasion, money laundering and terror financing, which could lead to severe legal and financial consequences for the

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A Web of Lies: Drill-Down on the IRGC's Shadow-Fleet NetworkMay 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - The recent Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command leak exposed a fleet of 21 vessels used for IRGC oil deliveries. The database presents evidence of all the classic Shadow Fleet techniques, from STS transfers to oil rebranding, and even “Trojan tanker”-level identity manipulation. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the backbone of the Iranian regime and a terrorist organization designated since 2007, was widely exposed by the US Treasury for its illicit and covert international oil export mechanism in July 2025. It was revealed how the IRGC facilitates an intricate web of commerce, using its own Turkish-based front company, Golden Globe Demir Celik Petrol (GDCP) to secretly funnel and sell oil, generating hundreds of millions in profits. In recent leak exposing both Nosazan Kaveh and GDCP, major evidence has surfaced, revealing how GDCP is still exporting oil via a fleet of 21 vessels. These tankers are a crucial part of the clandestine mechanism, built upo

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Tempest in a Teapot: Exposing New Evidence of Chinese Refineries and Other Customers Purchasing Petroleum From IRGC Trading ArmsMay 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Newly-exposed documents of Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command reveal the activities of its customers, including Chinese independent “teapot” refineries. The success of every business is often dependent on its customers. Good customers are typically reliable big spenders, with interests mostly aligned with the seller’s interests. In the case of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Corps (IRGC), its favorite customers are Chinese independent refineries, also known as “Teapots”. The newly-exposed documents of Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command reveal the scope of this heavily-sanctioned trade. These documents provide insight into the activities of six entities, including two prominent refineries: Qicheng Petrochemical Refinery and Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. The latter was recently designated by the US Treasury for its lack of regard for US sanctions and their propensity for evading them. none This letter

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Front Row Seat: Uncovering the IRGC’s Petroleum Trading FrontsMay 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - The IRGC uses multiple layers of front companies to conceal illicit oil exports. Confidential documents leaked and exposed on WikIran reveal the IRGC’s oil-command financial and trading fronts, as well as their complex array of generic front companies based in China and UAE. This network allows extensive sanctions evasion and funding of deadly weapons programs The WikIran team is working tirelessly to expose petroleum-trading mechanisms used by Iran’s military apparatus. In this article we dive deep into the IRGC’s clandestine petroleum trading network, analyzing it piece by piece. The IRGC, as well as the rest of Iran’s military organizations, share knowledge and experience with each other, making our past publications on IRGC-Quds Force, MODAFL, and AFGS valuable and informative for our readers, especially those seeking to understand the scope of Iran’s military organizations’

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Introducing Shahid Pour Jafari: The IRGC Oil Command May 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - For the first time, WikIran reveals Nosazan Kaveh and GDCP, shedding light on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)'s oil deals. The leak exposes a complex infrastructure of front companies, vessels and schemes, similar to the ones exposed in the Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ) database. Last December, as the bleak financial situation in Iran unfolded, large-scale protests began. In those protests, The IRGC rose as the primary oppressor of the Iranian people. A few months later, the IRGC used the ongoing conflict in the Middle East to justify launching deadly attacks on civilian targets, key energy facilities in the region and actors in international maritime trade. Most of the IRGC’s funding derives from the organization’s oil revenues, which are overseen by the Shahid Pour Jafari command and its front companies. That is why it's imperative that the system facilitating these harmful actions be uncovered and dismantled. The recent leak exposes the confidential

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Getting Ahead of the Game: Chinese Company Hedsa Co. Provides Iran with Sanctioned Surface-to-Air Missile ComponentsApr 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran obtained exclusive documents proving that Chinese company Hedsa Co., Limited is supplying the IRGC’s AIO with integral electronic components for advanced surface-to-air missile systems. The deal is executed under heavy obfuscation, so the true identity of the buyer – MODAFL – is not disclosed. China has been Iran’s lifelong partner, its primary customer of oil and petrochemical products, importing roughly two million barrels daily and allowing Iran to bypass US sanctions in order to fund its military activities. WikIran has covered this relationship for years, notably through the prism of Iranian military entities utilizing companies to sell sanctioned Iranian oil to Chinese refineries, such fronts as MODAFL’s Sahara Thunder and the AFGS’ Sepehr Energy Jahan. The Iran-China ties run deeper than “just” oil trade. Dual-use goods and other weapon- component transfers from China over

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Fake It Till You Make It: Exposing the Astonishing Scale of AFGS’s Identity-Theft Operations enabling the Iranian Shadow-Fleet Feb 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran’s exclusive materials reveal the massive scale of Sepehr Energy Jahan’s (SEJ) shadow-fleet operations, designed to conceal the identities of sanctioned tankers. The documents provide a detailed overview of the method, directly enabling the funding of both the AFGS and IRGC-QF. Over the past year, WikIran unfolded another key part of the Iranian security apparatus’ oil-export business, through the materials of Sepehr Energy Jahan’s (SEJ) and AFGS Shahid Abolfathi Oil Command. Following the publication of our article on the shadow-fleet’s tactic, involving tanker identity-theft, the WikIran team obtained additional exclusive documents shedding new light on the method and providing a better understanding of the way it works. After a thorough verification process, we can confirm the authenticity of the exclusive materials and present them to our readers. The photo

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Beneath the Surface: Uncovering the New Tactics of the Iranian Shadow Fleet Dec 2025

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran reveals a new network of tankers that serve the shadow fleet of the AFGS, managed and supervised by the Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), an Iranian front company for oil export. Wikiran exposes how SEJ continues to evade US sanctions and reveal a new tactic: Identity theft of real, existing vessels for camouflage purposes. Recent leaks confirm that Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), designated by the US Treasury, has operated oil export infrastructure for years under the radar, funding the Iranian security apparatus. Now, a new leak from the servers of Shahid Abolfathi Oil Command uncover clear evidence that SEJ continues to illegally export oil through its shadow fleet. The leaked data includes records of over 100 vessels that have facilitated and supported the illegal export of Iranian crude oil, directly fueling the financial empowerment of the Iranian security entities, including the IRGC and Quds Force. Among them, 20 vessels are already sanct

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Complicit or Careless? Banks Facilitating SEJ and the AFGS’ Sanctions Evasion and Money LaunderingDec 2025

WikiIran's Exclusive - Based on recently leaked data from the Abolfathi server, Wikiran exposes additional global banks that have provided financial services to Iranian front companies used by Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), thereby enabling for international sanctions evasion and facilitating money laundering, often unknowingly. Our previous investigation into SEJ revealed the primary "enabler" financial institutions within the shadow banking sector linked to Sepehr Energy Jahan. This latest leak does not contain large volumes of bank account details, but does allow us to expand the list of financial institutions that, apparently unknowingly, have participate in the money laundering activities of SEJ and its clients. This article examines the identified bank accounts and their respective host banks: | |COMPANY |COUNTRY |ACCOUNT NUMBER |BANK

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