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134 results

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A Web of Lies: Drill-Down on the IRGC's Shadow-Fleet NetworkMay 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - The recent Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command leak exposed a fleet of 21 vessels used for IRGC oil deliveries. The database presents evidence of all the classic Shadow Fleet techniques, from STS transfers to oil rebranding, and even “Trojan tanker”-level identity manipulation. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the backbone of the Iranian regime and a terrorist organization designated since 2007, was widely exposed by the US Treasury for its illicit and covert international oil export mechanism in July 2025. It was revealed how the IRGC facilitates an intricate web of commerce, using its own Turkish-based front company, Golden Globe Demir Celik Petrol (GDCP) to secretly funnel and sell oil, generating hundreds of millions in profits. In recent leak exposing both Nosazan Kaveh and GDCP, major evidence has surfaced, revealing how GDCP is still exporting oil via a fleet of 21 vessels. These tankers are a crucial part of the clandestine mechanism, built upo

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Tempest in a Teapot: Exposing New Evidence of Chinese Refineries and Other Customers Purchasing Petroleum From IRGC Trading ArmsMay 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Newly-exposed documents of Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command reveal the activities of its customers, including Chinese independent “teapot” refineries. The success of every business is often dependent on its customers. Good customers are typically reliable big spenders, with interests mostly aligned with the seller’s interests. In the case of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ Corps (IRGC), its favorite customers are Chinese independent refineries, also known as “Teapots”. The newly-exposed documents of Shahid Pour Jafari Oil Command reveal the scope of this heavily-sanctioned trade. These documents provide insight into the activities of six entities, including two prominent refineries: Qicheng Petrochemical Refinery and Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. The latter was recently designated by the US Treasury for its lack of regard for US sanctions and their propensity for evading them. none This letter

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Front Row Seat: Uncovering the IRGC’s Petroleum Trading FrontsMay 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - The IRGC uses multiple layers of front companies to conceal illicit oil exports. Confidential documents leaked and exposed on WikIran reveal the IRGC’s oil-command financial and trading fronts, as well as their complex array of generic front companies based in China and UAE. This network allows extensive sanctions evasion and funding of deadly weapons programs The WikIran team is working tirelessly to expose petroleum-trading mechanisms used by Iran’s military apparatus. In this article we dive deep into the IRGC’s clandestine petroleum trading network, analyzing it piece by piece. The IRGC, as well as the rest of Iran’s military organizations, share knowledge and experience with each other, making our past publications on IRGC-Quds Force, MODAFL, and AFGS valuable and informative for our readers, especially those seeking to understand the scope of Iran’s military organizations’

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Introducing Shahid Pour Jafari: The IRGC Oil Command May 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - For the first time, WikIran reveals Nosazan Kaveh and GDCP, shedding light on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)'s oil deals. The leak exposes a complex infrastructure of front companies, vessels and schemes, similar to the ones exposed in the Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ) database. Last December, as the bleak financial situation in Iran unfolded, large-scale protests began. In those protests, The IRGC rose as the primary oppressor of the Iranian people. A few months later, the IRGC used the ongoing conflict in the Middle East to justify launching deadly attacks on civilian targets, key energy facilities in the region and actors in international maritime trade. Most of the IRGC’s funding derives from the organization’s oil revenues, which are overseen by the Shahid Pour Jafari command and its front companies. That is why it's imperative that the system facilitating these harmful actions be uncovered and dismantled. The recent leak exposes the confidential

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Getting Ahead of the Game: Chinese Company Hedsa Co. Provides Iran with Sanctioned Surface-to-Air Missile ComponentsApr 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran obtained exclusive documents proving that Chinese company Hedsa Co., Limited is supplying the IRGC’s AIO with integral electronic components for advanced surface-to-air missile systems. The deal is executed under heavy obfuscation, so the true identity of the buyer – MODAFL – is not disclosed. China has been Iran’s lifelong partner, its primary customer of oil and petrochemical products, importing roughly two million barrels daily and allowing Iran to bypass US sanctions in order to fund its military activities. WikIran has covered this relationship for years, notably through the prism of Iranian military entities utilizing companies to sell sanctioned Iranian oil to Chinese refineries, such fronts as MODAFL’s Sahara Thunder and the AFGS’ Sepehr Energy Jahan. The Iran-China ties run deeper than “just” oil trade. Dual-use goods and other weapon- component transfers from China over

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Fake It Till You Make It: Exposing the Astonishing Scale of AFGS’s Identity-Theft Operations enabling the Iranian Shadow-Fleet Feb 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran’s exclusive materials reveal the massive scale of Sepehr Energy Jahan’s (SEJ) shadow-fleet operations, designed to conceal the identities of sanctioned tankers. The documents provide a detailed overview of the method, directly enabling the funding of both the AFGS and IRGC-QF. Over the past year, WikIran unfolded another key part of the Iranian security apparatus’ oil-export business, through the materials of Sepehr Energy Jahan’s (SEJ) and AFGS Shahid Abolfathi Oil Command. Following the publication of our article on the shadow-fleet’s tactic, involving tanker identity-theft, the WikIran team obtained additional exclusive documents shedding new light on the method and providing a better understanding of the way it works. After a thorough verification process, we can confirm the authenticity of the exclusive materials and present them to our readers. The photo

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Beneath the Surface: Uncovering the New Tactics of the Iranian Shadow Fleet Dec 2025

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran reveals a new network of tankers that serve the shadow fleet of the AFGS, managed and supervised by the Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), an Iranian front company for oil export. Wikiran exposes how SEJ continues to evade US sanctions and reveal a new tactic: Identity theft of real, existing vessels for camouflage purposes. Recent leaks confirm that Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), designated by the US Treasury, has operated oil export infrastructure for years under the radar, funding the Iranian security apparatus. Now, a new leak from the servers of Shahid Abolfathi Oil Command uncover clear evidence that SEJ continues to illegally export oil through its shadow fleet. The leaked data includes records of over 100 vessels that have facilitated and supported the illegal export of Iranian crude oil, directly fueling the financial empowerment of the Iranian security entities, including the IRGC and Quds Force. Among them, 20 vessels are already sanct

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Complicit or Careless? Banks Facilitating SEJ and the AFGS’ Sanctions Evasion and Money LaunderingDec 2025

WikiIran's Exclusive - Based on recently leaked data from the Abolfathi server, Wikiran exposes additional global banks that have provided financial services to Iranian front companies used by Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), thereby enabling for international sanctions evasion and facilitating money laundering, often unknowingly. Our previous investigation into SEJ revealed the primary "enabler" financial institutions within the shadow banking sector linked to Sepehr Energy Jahan. This latest leak does not contain large volumes of bank account details, but does allow us to expand the list of financial institutions that, apparently unknowingly, have participate in the money laundering activities of SEJ and its clients. This article examines the identified bank accounts and their respective host banks: | |COMPANY |COUNTRY |ACCOUNT NUMBER |BANK

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A Follow Up on Sepehr Energy Jahan: Meet Shahid Abolfathi, the Oil Command of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff and the Police Command Dec 2025

WikiIran's Exclusive - A recent leak of Shahid Abolfathi's servers sheds light on additional details of the Armed Forces General Staff’s (AFGS) oil operations, reveals connections to the FRAJA, and exposes key figures and operations of SEJ, the trading arm of the AFGS formerly exposed by WikIran. Our research indicates that the Shahid Abolfathi oil command oversees the better-known Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ) network, the petroleum trading arm of the AFGS, that appears to also serve FRAJA, the Iranian Police Command, which is most closely associated with crackdowns on civilians and widespread domestic human rights abuses. SEJ’s leaked materials, along with the US Treasury’s designation of Jamshid Eshaghi, identified Eshaghi as the commander of the unnamed Oil and Derivatives Command within the AFGS, an entity overseeing SEJ. However, new leaked documents related to oil sales and signed by Eshaghi himself confirms that he also leads the Shahid

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Customers of Controversy: Uncovering More of SEJ's illicit Oil Client Base Dec 2025

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran unveils new evidence on how Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ) continues to illegally export Iranian crude oil. This article will reveal the customers and oil brokers who benefit from the discounts on the prohibited oil. The recent SEJ and Abolfathi leak has uncovered a trove of confidential documents, including letters of intent (LOIs) and contracts, that 25 buyers actively participating in SEJ’s illicit oil trade – thus directly supporting Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). A February 2025 by SEJ's front company, Growth Trading Co Ltd, that was mentioned in our previous article, and the buyer - Qingdao Huixingyi Petrochemical Co. Ltd. pl1 According to the contract, the company will acquire 700,000 barrels of "Malaysia Blend Crude Oil", a well-documented disguise for Iranian crude oil. Two months later, after the shipment was delivered, the buyer

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